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THE 


PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


A Study in the Symbolism 
of Language <~ ey Ol 


Fae 


Bis 
; 


A TRANSLATION OF LL) ).)) 60 


ee oS a 


Saint Augustine’s — 
De Magistro 


BY 
FR. FRANCIS E. TOURSCHER, 0.58. A. 


VILLANOVA COLLEGE 
PENNSYLVANIA 
1924 





COPYRIGHT, 1924 


THE WICKERSHAM PRINTING CO. 
LANCASTER, PA. 


1924 


Nihil Obstat 
J. M. CORRIGAN, D. D. 


Censor Librorum 


Imprimatur 


DIONYSIUS CARDINALIS DOUGHERTY 
Archiepiscopus Philadelphiensis 


Permisan Ordinis Suprriorum 





INTRODUCTORY 


SAINT AUGUSTINE'S De Magistro, Englished here 
under the title of “ The Philosophy of Teaching or a 
Study in the Symbolism of Language’’, was written 
about A.D. 389, probably during the third year after 
his conversion. He was baptized by Saint Ambrose 
in Milan at Easter time, 387. In the survey of all 
his written works which Augustine made nearly 
forty years later, De Magistro is number twelve, 
counting books or distinct headings, it stands number 
twenty-eight in the list.* 


* The headings follow: 
PICEA COU CUTICISSOR ES Pisa taking hea tie ak ee Me ae Libri 3 


PRISE AEA MV bad Ne aa od aes os Dele ae Ri noe d Liber 1 
RRO LIE ees oe no Oe kG oe SUN a eee ek a ae ue ee Libri 2) 
PR ESEEREIBUCBE ATT OM MER UAY 02. ia shen ahs Sect, Boo ale sen oe aks oo Libri 2 
HDT e EOE Tr i ol ee a dy Se Liber 1 


De Grammatica ) 
De Dialectica 


De Rhetorica Libri 6 
Ss AES DN ince ea BEEN Vasant cer ae 

Pea i ideticn | these six school books 

De Philosophia are now lost 

De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae ....... 2.0.00 0cccene Libri 2 


_ 


Se Rratt ate SATIINGG (oo, os oe ts Pee ses av peediesa eke Liber 


6 INTRODUCTORY 


The Latin text of De Magistro was printed sep- - 
arately for school use by the present translator about 
four years ago. Later this was followed by the 
text of De Beata Vita, the Sololoqua, De Immor- 
talitate Animae and De Quantitate Animae, now in 
type. The purpose was, not to substitute the Christ- 
ian for the pre-Christian classics, but-to fill out and 
complete the study of style and expression in the 
older types by a knowledge of the later correct form 
and thought of ‘Christian teachers. So far as the 
translator’s experience goes the venture has proved 
practicable and a help to students in right thinking 
and a useable knowledge of Latin. 

The purpose of the translation 1s mainly to place 
within the reach of English readers, students and 
teachers some tangible evidence of facts in the lives 
of Christian thinkers, to show the quality of their 
thought, their methods of teaching, their contribu- 
tion to the education and the learning of their time. 
A chief aim of the translator has been to do some- 
thing to counteract a widely prevalent tradition in the 


De Tabro “Arbitrio’ 1550. 1.422 er ee eee Libri 3 
De: Genesi ad -Manichaéogs = .c4 20s. 4 ee Libri 2 
Dey Musica: s 62 cide ie eee Libri 6 
De. Magistro. c:). i) tac 1b dt as ee ee ee Liber I 


oot 


28 


INTRODUCTORY 7 


“history of education’, which exhibits the ‘Christ- 
ian Fathers unfairly and untruthfully as patrons of 
“reaction’’ and leaders in a “retrograde move- 
ment ”’. 

‘A translation of course labors always under the 
difficulty of differences in idiom. This difficulty is 
particularly hard to overcome in colloquial and dia- 
logue forms, where the very essence of clearness is 
found often in the brevity and conciseness of un- 
translatable terms. The translator acknowledges 
these inevitable defects, sometimes in diction, some- 
times in the thought, which will not quite square 
with our own accepted forms of English. 

| Fp Sid Be 
Villanova, Pennsylvania, 
November 1, 1923. 








THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


CRAP Teton 


AUGUSTINE—What, as it appears to you, do we 
wish to do when we speak? 

ADEODATUS—So far as it occurs to me now, we 
intend either to teach or to learn. 

Auc.—I see, and I am agreed as to one of these; 
for it is evident that we intend to teach by speaking, 
but how to learn? 

Av. — How think you, indeed, but by asking 
questions? 

Auc. — Even then, I take it that we aim at no 
other thing than teaching. For [to prove it] do you 
interrogate, I ask, for any other purpose than to 
teach him whom you question what you wish to 
know? 

Av.—You speak truly. 

AuGc.—You see, therefore, now that our aim, in 
the use of language, is none other than to teach. 

Ap.—I see it not clearly: for, if speaking is just 
putting forth words, I see that we do this when we 


10 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


sing, which we do often when we are alone, where _ 
no one is present to learn. The purpose then, I 
think, is not to teach. 

Avuc.—But there is, I believe, a kind of teaching 
by way of recalling, an important division indeed, 
which this very subject of our discourse will prove. 
But, if you think that we do not learn when we re- 
member, or that he does not teach who recalls, I 
will not oppose you: and I will acknowledge then 
two reasons for speaking (1. e.) to teach, and to 
renew the mind whether of others or of ourselves. 
This we do even when we sing: or does it not so 
appear to you? 

Av.—Not clearly—For it is seldom indeed that I 
sing in order to recall to mind, but only to please 
myself. 

Avuc.—TI see how you think. But do you not see 
that what pleases in chant is a certain harmony of 
sound, which, just because it is increased or dimin- 
ished by means of words, is one thing considered as 
language, quite another considered as chant? For 
chant is made by the flute and the harp; birds also 
sing, and we sometimes hum music without words, 
which sound can be called chant, it can not be said 
to be rational speech. Or is there anything that 
you can say against this? 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 11 


Av.—-Nothing at all. 

Auc.—Is it clear to you, then, that language 
was instituted for this sole purpose—Either to teach 
or to renew the mind? 

Ap.—lIt does so appear, if the fact did not move 
me that when we pray we speak surely: yet it is not 
right to think that God is taught by us, or that He 
must be memorialized as to our wants. 

AucG.—I think that you are cognizant of the fact 
that we are told to pray in the privacy of our own 
apartments * (by which are meant the inner recesses 
of the mind) for one reason only, that is, that God 
does not need to be taught or reminded by our 
speech in order to give us what we desire. He in- 
deed who speaks sends forth a sign of his will by 
means of articulate sound. But God is to be found, 
and He is to be adored in the inmost court of the 
rational soul, which is called the “‘ interior man”’. 
There He has deigned to make His temple. Or 
have you not read in the Apostle (St. Paul): 
“Know you not that you are the temple of God, 
and that the Spirit of God dwells in you?” * Also 
that Christ dwells in the “interior man”? * And 


1 Matthew, VI, 6. 
2T Corinthians, III, 16. 
3 Ephesians, III, 17. 


12 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


have you not noticed in the Psalm: “ Speak in your 
hearts, and repent in the privacy of your own den.” 
“Offer the sacrifice of justice, and hope in the 
Lord”?* Where, think you, but in the temple of 
the mind and in the privacy of our own heart? 
But where sacrifice is offered, there prayer also is 
made. Wherefore when we pray there is no need 
of the expression of language, that is, of sounding 
words: except, perhaps, as in the prayer of priests, 
for the purpose of making known the action of the 
mind, not in order that God may hear, but that the 
people may attend to the words of prayer, and by a 
kind of likeness of thought and a common operation 
of the mind, may learn how to depend upon God: 
or do you think otherwise? * 

Av.—I am in agreement fully. 

AuG.—It does not move you, then, that, when the 
Supreme Master was teaching his followers how to 
pray, He taught them certain forms of words, 
wherein, it appears, He taught them how we are to 
speak in prayer? 

Av.—That does not move me at all: for He did 
not teach them words, but realities, by means of 


4 Psalm IV, vers. 5-6. 


* See APPENDIX, note i,—page 96. 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 13 


words, by which they are to be reminded to whom 
prayer is to be made and for what object, when we 
pray (as has been said) in the privacy of our own 
mind. 

AvucGc.—You understand rightly: for you notice, 
I believe, at the same time, even when one frames 
an argument, although we may utter no sound, yet, 
because we are thinking words, we are speaking 
within, in the presence of the soul: So also in 
talking we do no other thing than recall, when 
memory, where words are stored away, revolving 
these, causes to come to mind the very realities of 
which words are the signs. 

Apv.—I understand, and I follow you. 


CUOAR TER. ii 


Auc. — It is agreed, therefore, between us that 
words are signs. 

Ap.—It is agreed. 

AuG.—What as to the meaning of a sign—lIf a 
thing does not signify something, can that thing be 
a sign? 

Apv.—It can not. 

AuGc.— How many words are in this line: — 
Si nihil ex tanta superis placet urbe relinqui? ° 


5 Virgil—Aeneid, book II, line 159. 


oy 


14 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEAICHING 


Apv.—Eight. 

Avuc.—tThere are therefore eight signs. 

Ap.—True. 

AvuGc.—You understand this line, I believe. 

Ap.—Well enough, I think. 

AuG.—Tell me one by one what the words signify. 

Ap.—I see indeed what if signifies, but I find no 
other word by which it can be expressed. 

Avuc.—Do you find this at least, whatever is sig- 
nified by this word, where is it? 

Ap. — It appears to me that zf signifies a hesi- 
tating: now where is hesitation, if it is not in the 
mind. 

Auc. —I take that for the present. Follow on 
over the rest. 

Apv.—* Nihil” —What does nothing signify but 
that which is not? 

AucG.— Perhaps you are right: but what you 
granted above recalls me from giving assent. You 
granted, that is, that no thing is a sign unless it 
signifies something. Therefore the second word in 
this line is not a sign because it does not signify 
something. Wrongly, then, was it agreed between 
us that all words are signs, or that every sign must 
signify something. 

Ap. — You urge me too hard: but surely it is 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 15 


utterly foolish to express any word when we have 
nothing to say. But you now, speaking with me, 
send forth no sound, I believe that is to no purpose. 
But by means of every word which proceeds from 
your lips you give me a sign by which I am to un- 
derstand something. Therefore you ought not to 
utter these two syllables, nihil, when you speak, if 
by them you do not signify something. But, if you 
see that they are and are pronounced, and that we 
are taught or reminded of something when they 
strike the ear, then you see surely what I wish to 
say, though I can not explain it. 

AuGc.—What, then, shall we do? Shall we say 
that by this word (nihil) a certain state of mind 1s 
signified, when it sees not its object, and as yet finds 
it not to be, or thinks that it has found it not to be 
a reality, rather than say that it is a something 
which is not? 

Ap. — That perhaps is what I was laboring to 
explain. 

AvuG.—Let us pass on then, lest we incur a very 
serious absurdity. 

Apv.—What absurdity, pray? 

AvuGc.—That nothing detains us, and we endure 
delay. : 

Av.—That is amusing indeed; and yet I see that 


16 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


it can happen, I know not how. Nay, more, I see 
plainly that it has happened. 

AuGc.—In its own proper place, if God grants it, 
we shall consider this kind of conflict more thor- 
oughly. Now get you back to that line, and try to 
explain, as you can, what its remaining words 
signify. 

Av.—The third word is a preposition ex, in place 
of which I think we can say de. 

AuG.—I am not asking you that, to express, in 
place of one word well known, another word equally 
well known which has the same meaning, if, indeed, 
it has the same meaning. But, granting for the 
time that it has, surely if the poet had said not: 
“ex tanta urbe’’, but “de tanta’’, and I were to 
ask you what de signifies, you would say ex; since 
these would be two words, that is, signs signifying, 
as you think, some one thing. But I am asking for 
that very reality, I know not what it is, which is 
signified by these two terms. 

Ap. — It seems to me that (this preposition e2) 
signifies a kind of separation from that reality in 
which something had been, which is now said to be 
out of it, whether that reality remains not, as in this 
line, the city, Troy being destroyed, some Trojans 
could yet remain out of it; or whether it remains, as 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 17 


we say out of the city Rome there are traders in 
Africa. 

Auc.—Granting that these things are so, and not 
counting up how many points perhaps may be found 
outside this your rule, this surely you can easily 
note, namely that you have been explaining words 
by means of words, that is, signs by means of signs; 
moreover signs well known by signs equally well 
known. But I would wish to have you show me, if 
you can, those very realities of which these are the 
signs. 


CHAR EER ALT 


Av.—I wonder that you know not, or rather that 
you are pretending that you do not know that what 
you wish can absolutely not be done by an answer 
of mine. We indeed are holding conversation 
where we can not give an answer except by means 
of words. But you are asking for those realities, 
which, whatever they are, are surely not words, 
which yet you ask of me also by means of words. 
You therefore ask first without the medium of 
words, so that, on that condition, I may be able to 
answer. 

AvucGc.—You act upon your right, I acknowledge: 
but, if I were to ask you what these three syllables 


18 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


mean when partes is pronounced, could you not 
point it out with your finger, so that I would see 
clearly the very reality, of which this word of three 
syllables is the sign, by your pointing, and yet 
utter not a word? 

Ap.—TI grant that can be done in the case of 
nouns only which signify things corporeal, and on 
condition that the corporeal realities are present. 

AuG.—Do we say that color is a body, or do we 
not rather say that it is a certain quality of bodies? 

AD.—So it is. 

Auc. — Why then cannot this be pointed out? 
Or do you add to the definition, bodies, the qualities 
also of bodies, so that these also, when they are 
present, can be shown without words? 

Ap. —I, when I said bodies, wished to have it 
understood of all things corporeal, that is of every- 
thing in bodies, that is perceived by the senses. 

Auc.— Consider Here yet again whether some 
points are not to be excepted. 

Ap.—You counsel well: for I should have said, 
not all corporeal things (and qualities), but all 
things visible: for I confess that smell and. taste 
and weight and heat and other phenomena, which 
belong to the different seness, while they can not be 
perceived without bodies, and therefore are cor- 
poreal, can not yet be pointed out by your finger. 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 19 


AuG.—Have you never seen how men, in a man- 
ner, converse with the deaf by means of gesture, 
and the deaf also by gesture ask questions and an- 
swer, and teach or indicate, if not all that they will, 
then very much? When this is done truly not 
visible things only are made plain, but sounds and 
tastes also and other things of this kind. Indeed 
actors also on the stage, by movement often lay 
open and unfold complete stories without words. 

Ap.—I have nothing to say against that, except 
that not only I, but that moving actor also can not 
make plain to you the meaning of that ex without 
words. 

AuG.—What you say, perhaps is true: But let us 
imagine that he can; you will not doubt, I think, 
that whatever that movement of the body is, by 
which he will try to make clear that which is signi- 
fied by this word, it will be not the reality itself but 
a sign. Wherefore he also will indicate, not indeed 
a word by means of a sign, but yet he will just as 
surely indicate a sign by means of a sign: so that 
this monosyllable ex and that gesture will signify 
one and the same reality, which I would wish to have 
shown to me without the making of a sign. 

Ap.—How, pray, can what you ask be done? 

Auc.—As the wall could. 


20 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


Ap.—Not even that, so far as reason advancing 
has taught, can be shown without a sign; for the 
extending of the finger is not indeed the wall, but a 
sign is given by which the wall may be seen. I see 
nothing, therefore, that can be shown without signs. 

Auc.—What if I were to ask you what walking 
is, and you were to rise and walk, would not you 
then make use of the reality itself (walking) rather 
than words or any other signs in order to teach me? 

Ap.—I acknowledge it is so, and I am ashamed 
that I did not see a thing so evident, from. which 
now thousands of things occur to me which can be 
shown by themselves, and not by signs, to eat, to 
drink, to sit down, to stand up, to shout, and un- 
numbered other things. 

AvuG.—Come now tell me, if I, absolutely ignor- 
ant of the meaning of this word, were to ask you 
walking what walking is, how would you teach me? 

Ap. —I would do the very same thing a little 
more quickly, so that by something new after your 
interrogation you would be made to note the fact, 
and yet nothing else would be done but that which 
was to be shown. 

AvuG.—Do you know that it is one thing to walk, 
another to make haste? And indeed he who walks 
does not straightway hasten; and he who makes 





SAINT AUGUSTINE 21 


haste does not necessarily walk. For we speak of 
haste in writing, in reading, and other things with- 
out number. Wherefore while you were doing 
more quickly what you had been doing, I, after my 
interrogation, might think that to walk is the same 
as to make haste, for that you had added anew, and 
therefore I would be deceived. 

Ap. —I confess that we can not show what an 
objective reality is without the means of a sign, if 
we are engaged in the act of that reality when we 
are interrogated. For if we add nothing anew, he 
who interrogates will think that we are not willing 
to answer, and will take himself as despised in the 
very fact of our persevering in what we were doing. 
But if he asks about those things which we can do, 
and, if he asks at a time when we-are not so en- 
gaged, then we can, following the interrogation, by 
doing what he inquires about, show him what he 
asks by means of the objective reality rather than a 
sign: Excepting perhaps (this one point) talking, 
if one should ask me talking what talking is: For 
whatever I shall say in order to teach him, I must 
talk. Whence continuing I will teach until I make 
clear to him what he wants to know, not departing 
from that very reality which he has desired to have 
shown to him; and looking for no other symbols by 
which to make it clear but language itself. 


~ 


22 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


CHAP DERE vy: 


Auc.—Very keen, indeed. Wherefore see now 
whether it is agreed between us that we can make 
clear those things without signs, which we are not 
doing when we are questioned, and which yet we 
can straightway do; or perhaps the very signs that 
we are doing (as language) : for when we speak we 
make signs, whence to signify has its name.* 

Ap.—It is agreed. 

Auc.— When therefore our question is about 
certain signs, signs can be made evident by means 
of'signs: but when we study realities that are not 
signs, they are made manifest either by doing that 
very thing if it can be done, after we are interro- 
gated, or by giving signs by which the mind’s atten- 
tion is turned to the object. 

AvD.—So it is. 

Auc. — In this threefold division, therefore, let 
us, if you will, in the first place, consider this, 
namely, that signs are shown by means of signs; 
for words are not the only signs. 

Ap.—No, they are not. 

AuG. —It seems to me, therefore, that we, by 
means of words in speaking, either signify words 


* de quo dictum est significare. 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 23 


or other signs, as when we express the word gesture 
or letter (for objects signified by these two words 
are themselves also signs); or again we signify 
something else that is not itself a sign, as when we 
say stone. This word is indeed a sign, for it signi- 
fies something, but what is signified is not therefore 
asign. This class, however, that is the class where 
those realities which are not signs are signified by 
words, does not belong to this division which we 
have taken up for study here. For we are engaged 
now in studying that class (of words) in which 
signs are signified by means of (other) signs; and 
there we found a two-fold subdivision, that is, when 
by means of signs we teach either the self-same or 
other signs: Or does it not so appear to you? 

Av.—That is evident. 

Auc.—Tell me, therefore, to which organic sense 
do those signs belong which are words? 

Ap.—To the hearing? 

Auc.—How about gestures? 

Av.—They belong to sight. 

Auc.—How when we find words written, are they 
not then words? Or are they more truly under- 
stood to be the signs of words? As a word may be 
defined as that which is uttered by articulate voice 
with some meaning: but voice can be perceived by 


24 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEAQHING 


no other sense than hearing, so it is that when a_ 
word is written, a sign is made to the eyes, by 
which that which belongs to the ears, comes to the 
mind. 

Ap.—I am agreed entirely. 

Avuc.—To this also, I think, you will assent: that 
when we say name (or noun) we signify some- 
thing. 

Ap.—It is true. 

Auc.—What, tell me, do we signify? 

Av.—That, namely, which anything is called, as 
Romulus, Rome, virtue, a river, and others innu- 
merable. 

Avuc.—Do these four nouns not signify some ob- 
jective reality? 

Av.—They do indeed. 

AvuG.—Is there not some difference between these 
nouns and the objective realities which are signified 
by them? 

Ap.—A great difference, indeed. 

AvuG.—I would like to hear from you what that 
difference is. 

Av.—This difference, in the first place, at least, 
that they (the nouns) are signs, these (the realities 
signified) are not. 

AvuG.—lIs it agreed that we call signifiable those 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 25 


things that can be signified by means of signs, and 
themselves are not signs, just as we give the name 
visible to things that can be seen, so that thence we 
can study them more readily ? 

Ap.—It is agreed truly. 

Auc. — How as to those four signs which you 
pronounced just a moment ago, can they not be 
signified by some other sign? 

Ap. —I marvel that you think that I have for- 
gotten now that we have found how things which 
are written are signs of words uttered by the voice 
—signs of signs. 

AvuGc.—Tell me what is the difference between the 
two. 

Ap. — That these latter are visible, the former, 
audible. Why indeed not admit this term, if we 
have accepted signifiable? 

AvucG.—I do admit it fully, and I thank you for it. 
But again, I ask, can not these four signs be signi- 
fied by some other audible sign, as you have re- 
ferred to visible signs? 

Ap.—That also, I remember, has just been stated. 
For I answered that a noun signifies something, 
and to this same signification I submitted the four; 
and I recognize that both this (a noun) and the 
others (realities), if they be uttered by the voice, 
are audible. 


26 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


Auc. — What difference, therefore, is there be- 
tween an audible sign and the audible realities signi- 
fied, which in turn are signs? - 

Ap.—Between that indeed which we speak of as 
a noun, and the four subjects which we ranked 
under the meaning of that term, I see this differ- 
ence, that the former (noun) is an audible sign of 
audible signs, but these latter are signs, indeed, 
audible; yet not signs of signs, but signs of realities, 
in part visible, as is Rome, Romulus, river, in part 
intelligible, as is virtue. 

Avuc.—I take your answer, and I approve it: but 
do you. know that everything that is uttered by 
articulate voice with some meaning is called a word? 

Av.—I do know. 

Avuc.—Therefore a noun also is a word, since we 
see that it is uttered with a meaning by means of 
articulate voice: and when we say that an eloquent 
man uses fair words, he uses also fair nouns: and 
when the slave in Terence replied to the old master: 
“ Fair words I ask” he expressed also many nouns. 

Ap.—I am agreed.°® | 

AvuG.—You grant, therefore, that by these two 
syllables which we pronounce when we say verbum, 


6 Publius Terentius, Afer, born in Carthage about 185 
B. C, The quotation is from Andria, Act I, scen. 2. 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 27 


a noun also is signified; and therefore this is the 
sign of that. 3 

Ap.—I grant it. 

Auc.— This also I would have you answer— 
Since a word is the sign of a noun, and a noun is 
the sign of river, and river is the sign of a reality 
which can be seen; just as between this reality and 
river, that is, the sign of it, and again between this 
sign and noun, which you said is the sign of this 
sign, there is some difference; so what think you 
is the difference between the sign of a noun, which 
we found to be a word, and the noun itself, of which 
the word is a sign? 

Ap.—I understand this to be a difference, that 
those things which are signified by a noun (or a 
name) are signified therefore by means of a word: 
For as noun is a word, so also is rivera word. But 
everything that is signified by means of a word is 
not signified therefore asa noun. For that st which 
is at the head of the line proposed by you, and this 
ex, on which, talking now for a long time, we have 
come thus far by way of reason, are words, and 
yet they are not nouns; and many such are found. 
Wherefore, since all nouns are words, it is evident, 
I think, what difference there is between a word 
and a noun, that is, between the sign of that sign 


28 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


which signifies no other signs, and the sign of that 
sign which in turn signifies other signs. 

Auc.—Do you grant that every horse is an ani- 
mal, yet that every animal is not a horse? 

Apv.—Who would doubt it? 

Auc.—There is this difference, therefore, between 
a noun and a word which is between horse and ani- 
mal. Unless this perhaps keeps you from giving 
your assent, that we speak of a verb (verbum, a 
word) also in another sense, where those words are 
signified which are declined through time, as scribo, 
scripst, lego, legit; which, it is clear, are not nouns. 

Apv.—You have said just what was making me 
hesitate. 

Avuc.—Let that not move you. We speak indeed 
of signs in a general sense, comprehending every- 
thing that symbolizes anything; there we find words 
are included. We speak again of military stand- 
ards‘ which are properly so named (symbols of 
allegiance, as our national flag). Words do not 
belong to this class. And yet, if I were to tell you 
that as every horse is an animal, but not every ani- 
mal a horse, so every word is a sign, but not every 
sign a word, you would, as I think, not hesitate. 


7 signa militaria. 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 29 


Av.—Now I understand, and I am fully agreed 
that there is that difference between the general term 
word and a noun which we find between animal 
and horse. 

AuG.— Do you note also, when we say animal, 
that this trisyllabic noun which is uttered by the 
voice, is one ey the one signified quite an- 
other? 

Av.—I granted that above referring to all signs 
and to all things signifiable. 

Auc.—Does it appear to you that all signs signify 
something other than they are, as this word of three 
syllables when we say animal does not signify what 
itself is? 

Av.—Not at all: for when we say sign, that word 
signifies not only all other signs whatsoever, but it 
signifies itself also; for itself is a word, and all 
words are signs. 

Auc.—How in this word of two syllables when 
we pronounce verbum, is not something similar 
verified? For if everything that is uttered by artic- 
ulate voice with some meaning is symbolized by this 
word of two syllables, then itself also is included in 
this class. 

Apv.—So it is. 

Auc. — Now, is not the same true of a noun? 


30 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEAQHING 


For the word signifies nouns of all kinds, and noun 
itself is a noun of the neuter gender. Or, if I were 
to ask you what part of speech a noun is, could you 
correctly give me any answer other than a noun? 

Ap.—You speak truth. 

Auc.— There are, therefore, symbols, which, 
among other things that they symbolize, symbolize 
also themselves. 

Av.—There are. 

Auc. — Does it appear to you that this word of 
four syllables, which we pronounce when we say 
conjunctio, is of this class? 

Apv.—Not at all: for the things which it signifies 
are not nouns, but itself is a noun. 


CHAPTER V 


AvuG.—You have taken note well. Now take this 
point: See whether signs can be found which signify 
each other mutually, so that this may be signified by 
that, and that by this in turn: for this is not verified 
in that word of four syllables, when we say con- 
junctio, and the real objects which are signified by 
it when we express them: s1, vel, nam, namque, nisi, 
ergo, quoniam, and the like. These all are signified 
by the one (conjunction) ; but by not one of these 
is this quadrisyllabic word signified. 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 31 


Apv.—I see, and I am eager to know what a:e the 
signs which signify each other mutually. 

Avuc.—You do not know, then, that when we say 
noun and word we express two words? 

Ap.—I do know. 

Avuc. — How this, then, do you not know that 
when we say noun and word we are expressing two 
nouns? 

Av.—That also I know. 

Auc.—You know, therefore, that noun is s:gni- 
fied by means of a word, and word by means of a 
noun. 

Av.—I am agreed. 

AvuGc.—Can you tell in what these two differ, ex- 
cepting this point, that they are written and pro- 
nounced differently ? 

Ap. — Possibly I can; for I see that difference 
which I stated just a little ago. For when we ex- 
press words we signify everything that is uttered by 
the voice articulate with some meaning: whence 
every noun and noun itself, when we express it, is 
a word; but not every word is a noun, though word 
is a noun when we use it in a sentence. 

AvuGc.—What if someone should state to you and 
prove that as every noun is a word, so every word 
is a noun; could you find what is their difference 
apart from the different sound of their letters? 


bo 


THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


Ap.—I could not: and I think there would be no 
other difference at all. 

Avuc. — What if all sounds uttered by articulate 
voice with some meaning are indeed both words 
and nouns; and yet for one purpose are nouns, for 
another words, will there be any difference then be- 
tween a noun and a word? 

Av.—I do not understand how that can be. 

AvuG.—tThis at least you understand, that every 
colored object is visible, and every visible object is 
colored: although these two words (colored and 
visible) have a distinct and a different meaning. 

Av.—I understand. 

Avuc.—What, then, if in this way every word is 
a noun, and every noun a word, though these two 
nouns or these two words, that is noun and word, 
may have a different meaning? 

Ap. —I see now that this can be true; but I am 
waiting to have you show me how it is done. 

AuG.—Everything that goes forth by means of 
articulate voice with some meaning you note, I be- 
lieve, both strikes the ear so that it can be perceived, 
and is stored in the memory so that it can be made 
an object of knowledge. 

Av.—I take note. 

AuG.—Two things, therefore, are verified when 
we utter anything with such voice. 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 33 


AD.—So it is. 

Auc.—What if, of these two, words get their 
name from one fact, nouns from another: words, 
that is, (verba)* from vibrating, nouns from 
knowing; so that the former may have come to 
have its name from the ears, the latter from the 
mind? 

Apv.—I will grant that when you shall have shown 
me how we can say correctly that all words are 
nouns. 

Auc. — That is easy: for you have learned and 
you retain, I believe, that a pronoun is so named be- 
cause it can stand in the place of a noun, that yet it 
marks reality with signification less clear than the 
noun. Indeed, so, I think, he defined to whom you 
responded in the study of grammar: A pronoun is 
a part of speech, which, placed instead of a noun, 
signifies the same thing, though less completely. 

Av.—I do recall and I approve. 

AvuGc.—You see, therefore, according to this defi- 
nition, that pronouns can serve only nouns, and can 
stand only in their stead, as when we say: this man; 
the ruler himself; the same woman; this gold; that 
silver: This, himself, same, this and that are pro- 


8 vyerba a verberando: nomina a noscendo. 


34 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


nouns: man, ruler, woman, gold, silver are nouns, 
by which the realities are more completely signified 
than by the pronouns. 

Ap.—I see, and I am agreed. 

Auc. — You now give me a few conjunctions, 
any that you choose. 

Av.—Et, que, at, atque. 

Avuc.—Do not all these which you have expressed 
appear to you to be nouns? 

Av.—Not at all. 

Auc.—I at least appear to you to have spoken 
correctly when I said: all these that you have ex- 
pressed? 

Ap.—Right, indeed: and now I understand, when 
you have made it wonderfully clear, that I did ex- 
press nouns: for otherwise the expression all these 
could not be used correctly. But yet I fear that 
you appear to me to have spoken correctly therefore 
because [ admit that these four conjunctions are also 
words; and so all these can be said of them correctly 
because we say correctly: all these words. But if 
you ask me: What part of speech is words, I answer 
nothing other than a noun: Wherefore perhaps it is 
to this noun that the pronoun refers, so that your 
language is correct. 

Auc. — Shrewdly, indeed, are you wrong: but, 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 35 


that you may be undeceived, note more closely what 
I say, if, in fact, I can say it as I wish: for to treat 
of words by means of words is a puzzling task as 
is the intertwining and rubbing of one’s fingers, 
where it is hardly known, except by him who does "tt, 
which fingers are itching and which are relieving 
the sensation of itch. 

Ap.—Behold, I am all attention, for this figure 
has aroused me thoroughly. 

AuGc.—Words certainly are made up of sound 
and letters. 

AvD.—So they are. 

Auc.—Therefore (to use, in the first place, that 
authority which is most dear to us), when the 
Apostle Paul says: “ There was not in Christ tt 1s 
and it is not, but it 14s was in Him”’,® it is not to 
be thought, I believe, that these three letters, which 
we pronounce when we say est, were in Christ, but 
that rather which is signified by these three letters. 

Ap.—You speak truth. 

AucGc.—You understand, then, that he who says: 
“Tt is was in Him”’, has stated nothing else than 
that, that which was in Him, was called est: as if 
he had said: “In Him was power”, he surely 


® II Corinthians, I, 19. 


36 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


would be understood as saying (or meaning) no 
other thing than that “that which is called power 
was in Him’”’: so that we are not to think that the 
two syllables, which we pronounce when we say 
virtus were in Him, instead of the reality which is 
signified by these two syllables. 

Ap.—I understand and follow you. 

Auc.— How do you not now understand this 
also, that it makes no difference whether one says: 
virtus appellatur, or virtus nominatur — virtue 1s 
called, or virtue is named? 

Av.—That is evident. 

AucG. — Therefore it is evident that it makes no 
difference whether one says thus: what was in Him 
is called, or what was in him is named? 

Av.—I see that here also there is no difference. 

AvucG.—Do you see then also what I wish to prove? 

Ap.—Not yet, clearly. 

AuG.—Do you not then see that a noun is that by 
which some reality is named? 

Ap.—That I see, nothing more surely. 

Auc. — You see, therefore, that est is a noun, 
since that which “‘ was in him” is named est. 

Ap.—I can not deny it. 

Auc. — But if I were to ask you what part of 
speech EsT is, you would, I think, say not that it is 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 37 


a noun, but a verb; though reason has shown that 
it is also a noun. 

Ap.—It is so, just as you say. 

Auc.—Do you hesitate to admit now that other 
parts of speech are nouns in the same way in which 
we have proved? 

Ap. —I doubt it not, since I acknowledge that 
they also signify something. But, if you ask what 
individually the realities which they signify are 
called, that is, what they are named, I can answer 
only those very parts of speech which they are, 
which we do not call nouns: though we are con- 
vineed, I see, that they are nouns. 

Avuc.—Does it not move you that someone may 
rise to make this our reasoning fall by saying that 
it is not the authority of words, but of reality that 
we must grant to the Apostle: wherefore the foun- 
dation of this proof is not so solid as we think. 
For it may be that Saint Paul, though he lived most 
correctly, and gave precepts, yet perhaps did not 
speak correctly when he said: “est in illo erat’’; 
particularly since he himself acknowledges that he 
is unskilled in speech? How think you now is such 
a one to be answered? 

Avp.—I have nothing to oppose; and I beg you to 
find some one to whom the knowledge of words is 


38 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


granted to be very high, by whose authority you 
may prove preferably what you aim to do. 
Avuc.—All authorities aside, does not the reason- 
ing itself seem to you connected, where it is proved 
that something is signified by every part of speech; 
and that from that it has a name, and if it has a 
name it is called by that name, and if it is called 
by a name, it is a noun. This is very easily dis- 
cerned in different languages. Who indeed does 
not see that if you ask what the Greeks name that 
which we name quis, the answer is tis; what the 
Greeks name that which we name volo, the answer 
is thelo; what the Greeks name that which we name 
bene, the answer is kalos; what the Greeks name 
that which we name scriptum, the answer is ge- 
grammenon; what the Greeks name that which we 
name et, the answer is kat; what the Greeks name 
that which we name ab, the answer is apo; what the 
Greeks name that which we name heu, the answer 
is ho1:—and now in all these parts of speech which 
I have enumerated who does not see that he who 
questions speaks correctly ?>—which could not be if 
they (the various parts of speech) were not used as 
nouns. By this reasoning, therefore, we can hold 
that Saint Paul spoke correctly, aside from the 
authority of all those who are skilled in speech. 


— 
am 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 39 

| 

What need, then, to look for someone on whose 
word our decision is to rest? 

But in order that no one, too slow to under- 
stand, or too stubborn to admit it, may still insist, 
and say that he will yield only to those authors to 
whom the laws of language are granted by ail men, 
what can be found more excellent in the Latin lan- 
guage than Cicero? Yet he, in his best orations, 
which are named “ Against Verres’’, calls coram,’° 
a preposition, or it may be in this place an adverb, 
a noun. However, since it may be that I do not 
understand this passage perfectly; and it can be 
explained otherwise by someone else, it is not, I 
think, to the. point to solve the problem. The 
worthiest masters of argument teach now that a 
complete sentence is made up of a noun and a verb. 
This sentence, they say, may be affirmative or nega~ 
tive. Cicero, in a certain place, calls this a pro- 
nouncement:** and when it is the third person of 
the verb, it must be, they say, the nominative case 
of the noun: and they say rightly, as you will 
acknowledge with me, I think, if you reflect how 


10 In Verrem—dActione II, lib. 2, nn. 41-42. 


11 Pronouncement — “Id est, pronuntiatum, quod est 
verum aut falsum ”.— Cicero, Tusculanae Quaestiones, I, 7. 


~ 


40 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


we say: A man takes his seat—-A horse runs. 
These are two pronouncements.*” 

Ap.—I understand. 

Auc.—You see that in-each sentence the noun is 
singular, in one it is man, in the other, horse; and 
the verbs, in one, “‘ takes his seat’’,’® in the other, 
—runsi 

Apv.—I do see. 

Auc.—tTherefore, if I were to say “sits”’ only, 
or “runs’’, you rightly might ask me who or what, 
so as to get my answer: man or horse, or animal, 
or anything else, whereby the noun corresponding 
to the verb would complete the sentence, that is, the 
expressed judgment by which something can be 
affirmed or denied. 

Ap.—I understand. 

Auc.—wNote, now, the rest; and suppose that we 
see something at a distance, and that we are not 
sure whether it is an animal or a stone, or some- 
thing else: and suppose that I say to you: because 
it is a man, it is an animal, would that not be 
illogical ? 


12 duo esse pronunciata. 


13 sedet. 


SAINT AUGUSTINE . 41 


Av.—Illogical, yes; but it would not be bad logic 
if you were to say: if it is a man, it is an animal. 

AvuG.—You speak correctly: accordingly if pleases 
me in your speech, it pleases you also; but because 
is offensive to both of us. 

Ap.—I am agreed. 

Auc. — See now whether these two sentences 
make complete pronouncements: “if pleases ’’; “ be- 
cause offends ’’? 

Ap.—Complete, truly. 

Auc.—Come, now, tell me which there are verbs, 
which are nouns? 

Ap.—The verbs, I see, are placet and displicet; 
but the nouns, Shee other than if and because “3 
et quia)? 

AvuG.—It is sufficiently proved, then, that these 
two prepositions are also nouns. 

Apv.—Quite sufficiently. 

AvucGc.—Can you show for yourself that this same 
holds, according to the same rule, in other parts of 
speech also? 

Ap.—I can. 


42 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


CHAP LEROVA 


Auc. — Let us go on, then: and, now, tell me 
whether, as we have found that all words are nouns, 
and all nouns are words, so it appears to you that 
all nouns may be seen to be vocal terms, and all 
vocal terms nouns. 

Ap.—Plainly what difference there is here, aside 
from the difference of the sound of syllables, I see 
not. 

Auc.— And I, for the present, do not oppose, 
though there are some who make a difference in 
meaning :—we need not weigh their judgment now. 
But you note, surely, that we have reached those 
signs now, which mutually signify each other, with 
no difference of meaning, but of sound only; and 
which signify themselves together with all other 
parts of speech. . 

Av.—I do not understand. 

AuG.—You do not understand, then, that a noun 
is signified by a vocal term, and a vocal term by a 
noun; and in such way that, aside from the sound 
of letters, there is no difference so far as the com- 
mon noun is concerned: for of the proper noun we 
say that it belongs to the eight parts of speech in 
such a way that it does not contain the other seven. 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 43 


Apv.—1I understand. 

Avuc.—And that is what I have said, that; namely, 
a vocal term and a noun mutually signify each other. 

Av.—I hold that: but how have you said, I ask, 
that while they signify themselves, they signify 
themselves together with the other parts of speech? 

AuG.—Has not reason shown above that all parts 
of speech can be said to be nouns and also vocal 
terms; that is, that they can be signified by means 
of a noun or a vocal term? 

Ap.—It is true. 

Auc.—What about noun itself, that is, the sound 
[nomen] expressed by two syllables, if I ask what 
you call it, will you not answer correctly: a noun? 

Apv.—Correctly. 

Auc.—Does:this symbol, now, so signify itself, 
which we pronounce by means of four syllables 
when we say: conjunctio? ‘This noun indeed can 
not be counted with those which signify themselves. 

Av.—Correctly, I get it. 

AvuGc.—That is what has been said: that a noun 
[namely] signifies itself together with other things 
which it signifies: which you also, of yourself, can 
understand of the vocal term. 

Ap.—It is easy now: but this comes to mind to 
me now, that a noun is spoken of as common or 


“ 


44 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEAICHING 


proper; while a vocal term is not contained among 
the eight parts of speech. Wherefore I judge that 
they differ on this point too, beyond the difference 
of sound. 

Auc.—How about nomen and onoma; think you 
that there is any difference, beyond the different 
sound, wherein also the languages are distinct, 
Latin and Greek? 

Apv.—Here, indeed, I understand no other dif- 
ference. 

AuGc.—We have come to signs, therefore, which 
both signify themselves, and something else is sig- 
nified by each in turn, and whatever is signified by 
one, that also by the other; and there is no differ- 
ence except in the sound. This, now, we have found 
to be the fourth, for the three former are under- 
stood in the noun and the word. 

Av.—Truly, that point is settled. 


CAD CE hay oe 


AvuG.—I wish now to have you review what we, 
in our reasoning, have discovered. 

Ap.—I will do that so far as I can. First of all, 
I remember we were searching why we use language, 
and it was found that we speak for the purpose 
either of teaching or recalling; since, even when we 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 45 


ask a question, we do no other thing than that by 
which he, whom we question, may learn what we 
want to hear; and in singing, what we seem to do 
for the sake of delight is not a property of language. 
In praying to God, of whom we can not think as 
being taught or reminded by us, words have this 
force, that by them we either remind ourselves, or 
others are reminded or taught by us. Then, when 
it was proved well enough that words are nothing 
else but signs, and that what does not signify some- 
thing can not be a sign, you proposed a line, of 
which I was to try to show what the words, one by 
one, signify. But this line was: “ Si nihil ex tanta 
superis placet urbe relinqui”. The second word of 
this line (nihil), though its use is most familiar, its 
meaning clear, yet, as to its exact signification, we 
were not finding it: And when it appeared to me 
that we do not give this word a place to no purpose 
in speaking, but that by it we teach our hearer some- 
thing, you replied that by this word, perhaps, a state 
of mind is indicated, when the mind finds not what 
it seeks, or thinks that it has not found. You, in- 
- deed [suggested this]; but yet you put off the un- 
explored difficulty of the problem to be cleared up 
at some other time, avoiding the force of the ques- 
tion by a jest: and do not think that I have for- 


46 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


gotten your obligation. Next, then, when I was try- 


ing hard enough to explain the third word in the 
line, I was urged by you not to show what one word 
meant by another word which might have the same 
meaning, but rather to make clear the objective 
reality which is signified by words. And, when I 
had said that this can not be done by our conversa- 
tion, we came to those things which can be pointed 
out by the finger to those who question about them. 
These objects I thought were all things corporeal, but 
we found them to be only things visible. From this 
we passed on to the deaf and to actors, [ know not 
just how, to those who signify by gesture, without 
a word, not only things that can be seen, but almost 
everything that we speak: we found, however, that 
these gestures are signs. Then again we began to 
study how we might show those very realities, which 
are known by means of signs, without any symbols; 
since this wall, and color, and everything visible 
that is pointed out by extending the finger is proved 
to be shown by a kind of sign. Here, when I had 
said, wrongly indeed, that no such thing could be 
found, it was finally agreed between us that those 
things can be shown without a sign, which we are 
not doing when we are questioned, and which we 
can do straightway after we are interrogated: that 


‘ 


SAINT AUGUSTINE : AT 


language yet does not belong to this class; since it 
appeared clearly enough, that if we are asked what 
talking is while we are talking, it is easy to show 
that by means of itself. | 

We were reminded then that signs are made 
manifest by means of signs, or, by means of signs, 
other things that are not signs, or again, without 
the medium of a sign, realities [external and visible 
actions] which we can do following an interroga- 
tion about them: and of these three we took up the 
first to be studied and discussed more carefuliy. In 
this discussion it was made clear that there are some 
signs which are not signified in turn by the signs 
which they signify, as is this word of four syllables 
when we say conjunction. On the other hand, it 
was made clear that there are signs also which are 
signified in turn by the signs which they themselves 
are, as when we express the word sign, we signify 
a sign; for sign and word are two signs and also 
two words. But in this class, where signs signify 
each other mutually, it was shown that some are 
unequal in force [or comprehension], others are 
equal, and others again identical. For this word of 
two syllables which is expressed when we say signi 
(sign) signifies everything absolutely by which any- 
thing is signified: but when we say word (verbum) 


48 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


it is not the sign of all signs, but of those only that 
are uttered by articulate voice. Whence it is clear 
that though a word may be signified by a sign, and 
a sign by a word, these latter two syllables by 
the former, and the former by the latter (verbum 
and signum), yet signum has greater comprehension 
than verbum, since these two syllables (signum) 
signify more objects than the other two (verbum). 
But the general term word and a common noun 
have the same value. For reason showed that all 
parts of speech are nouns also, since they can be 
used in connection with pronouns, and that they get 
a name can be said of all; and there is not one of 
them, used in conjunction with a verb, that may 
not make a complete sentence. But, while a noun 
and a word may have the same force, for this reason 
that all words may be also used as nouns, they have 
yet not the same comprehension. For it was proved 
quite clearly enough that words are so called from 
one cause, nouns from another. Indeed, that one 
of these is found to refer to the vibration of the ear, 
the other to noting down the thought of the soul, can 
be understood also from this, that we say speaking 
correctly: what is the name of this thing, wishing to 
give the object to the memory; but we are not wont 
to say: what is the word of this thing. But terms 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 49 


which signify, not only as much [one as the other], 
but the very same, we found to be nomen and onoma. 
This point truly had escaped me in the division 
where symbols signify each other mutually, that we 
had found no symbol which among other things 
that it signifies, signifies also itself. These points I 
have recalled so far as I could. You now see, you, 
whom I believe to have spoken always knowing and 
sure of what you said, see whether I have set them 
forth well and in order. 


—- 


Gis Tod 4 MOR area OBE 


AuGc.—You indeed have reviewed from memory 
well enough all that I wanted: and, I acknowledge 
to you, these points are now seen much more clearly 
by me than they were when by questioning and 
arguing we both were drawing them forth from 
some unknown obscurity. But whereto, by such 
tortuous ways, I am laboring to reach with you, is 
not easy to say at present. You think perhaps, in- 
deed, that we are jesting and recreating the mind 
from more serious subjects by apparently childish 
questions; or that we are looking for some small or 
unimportant advantage: or, if you have a suspicion 
that this problem is to bring forth something great, 
you are eager now to know, or at least to hear it. 


50 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


But I wish you to be assured that I have not been 
teaching shallow jests in this conversation, though 
possibly we do jest, this too is not to be measured 
in a childish sense, and we are thinking of no little 
or common good. And yet if I say that there is a 
certain life of contentment, and that everlasting, 
whereto, God being our guide, that is, the truth itself 
leading us.—If I say that thereto I wish to be 
brought by degrees accommodated to our slow prog- 
ress, I fear that I may seem to be unwise, because I 
have begun to enter upon the way not by the study 
of the very realities themselves, but of symbols only. 
You will pardon me, then, if I make this prelude 
with you, not for the purpose of amusing, but to 
exercise the powers and the keenness of the mind, 
by which we may be enabled not only to endure, but 
to love the warmth and the light of that region 
where is the life of contentment. 

Av.—Go on rather as you have begun, for never 
shall I think those things worthy of scorn which you 
shall have thought deserving of words and action. 

AuG.—Come, then, let us study now that division 
where, not signs are signified by means of other 
signs, but, by means of signs, other things which we 
call signifiable. And first of all, tell me whether 
man is man. 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 51 


Ap.—Now, indeed, I know not whether you are 
jesting. 

Auc.—Why so? 

Ap. — Because you think that I am to be asked 
whether man is aught else than man. 

Auc. —So you would think, I believe, that you 
are made an object of jest, even if I were to ask if 
the first syllable of this noun is anything other than 
ho, and the second aught else than mo. 

Av.—So indeed. 

AvuG.—But these two syllables united are homo: 
or do you deny it? 

Av.—Who can deny it? 

AuG. —I am asking, therefore, whether you are 
these two syllables united. 

Av.—Not at all: but I see your purpose. 

AvuG. — Say it, therefore, so that you may not 
think of me as offending. 

Apv.—The logical inference, you think, is that I 
am not a man. 

- Auc. — Why, do you not think the same, since 
you grant that all the foregoing, on which this in- 
ference is built, are true [inferences] ? 

Ap.—I shall not tell you what I think, until I hear 
from you whether you, when you asked if man is 
man, were asking about these two syllables (homo), 
or the objective reality which they signify. 


52 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


Auc.—You rather answer on which side you un- 
derstood my question. For if the question is am- 
biguous, you should have been on guard against 
that, and you should not have answered until you 
were certain as to how I meant the question. 

Ap.—How could that ambiguity trip me, when I 
have answered both: for homo is surely homo; and 
these two syllables are nothing more than two syl- 
lables; and that which they signify is nothing other 
than what it is. 

Avuc.—Keenly that, indeed: but why did you take 
the word homo only, and not the other words that 
we uttered, for both [symbol and object symbol- 
ized]? 

Av.—How is it proved that I did not so under- 
stand the other words? 

AvuG.—To omit other points, if you had under- 
stood that first question of mine on the side only of 
the sounding syllables, you should have answered 
nothing: it would appear indeed that I had asked 
nothing: but now, when I have pronounced three 
words, one of which I have repeated at the center, 
saying: utrum homo homo sit, it is clear that you 
understood the first word and the last, not the 
second, as signs: but that you took the second for 
the objects signified is proved even by this that im- 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 53 


mediately, without suspicion and secure you thought 
of answering my question. 

AvD.—You say truly. 

AuG. — Why, therefore, did you choose to take 
the word at the center only both according to what 
it sounds and according to what it means? 

Ap. — Behold, now, I take it on that side only 
where the object is signified: for I am agreed with 
you that absolutely we can not carry on a conversa- 
tion except by means of words, which when they are 
heard, the mind is carried to the objective realities 
of which words are the signs. Wherefore, show 
me now how it is that I am deceived by that sophism 
in which the conclusion is that J am not a man. 

Avuc.—No, but I will ask the question again, in 
order that you yourself may find where you were 
tripped. 

Av.—You do well. 

AvuG.—I shall not ask, then, what I asked in the 
first place, because you have granted that now. 
See, therefore, more carefully whether the syllable 
ho is nothing other than ho, and whether mo is 
nothing else than mo. 

Ap.—I see here nothing else at all. 

AuG.—See also whether homo is formed by the 
union of these two. 


D4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


Ap.—I should not have granted that at all: for 
it was decided, and decided correctly, that when the 
sign is expressed we take note of the object signi- 
fied; and, from the consideration of that, we assent 
to what has been said, or we dissent. But these 
two syllables pronounced separately, because they 
have sounded without any signification, are just 
what they sound. This has been granted. 

Auc. —It is granted, therefore, and you hold it 
fixed in mind that questions are to be answered only 
on the side of real objects, which are signified by 
means of words. 

Apv.—I do not see why we are not agreed upon 
that point, provided only that the words be words. 

Avuc.—I would like to know how you meet that 
one of whom we are wont to be told in jesting that 
the conclusion of the one with whom he was 
wrangling was that a lion had proceeded from his 
mouth: For when he had asked whether those 
things which we speak proceed from our mouth, 
and he (the one with whom the dispute was carried 
on) could not deny it, the other sophist turned the 
subject of conversation (which was easily done) so 
as to have his opponent name a lion; this done, he 
began, laughingly, to chaff him, and to force the 
argument, that because he had granted that what we 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 55 


speak goes forth from our mouth, and he could not 
deny that he had uttered lion, it must be clear that a 
man so meek had thrown out a brute so savage. 

Ap.—It had not been hard to meet this punster: 
for I would not grant that whatsoever we speak 
proceeds from our mouth. Indeed we signify the 
things that we speak; but from the mouth of the 
speaker proceeds, not the objective reality which is 
signified, but a sign which is a symbol of the object ; 
excepting where the very signs themselves are sig- 
nified, which division we considered just a little 
above. 

Auc. — You would be armed quite well indeed 
against that opponent: however, what will you an- 
swer me asking whether man is a noun? 

Ap.—W hat, but that it is‘a noun? 

Avuc.—Now, when I see you, do I see a noun? 

Apv.—No. 

Avuc.—Will you have me to tell you what follows, 
as a logical conclusion? 

AvD.—No; do not, I beg of you: for I answer my- 
self that I am not the man who, I say, is a noun, 
when you ask whether man is a noun. For it has 
been settled that we give assent or dissent on the 
side of the reality which is signified. 

Avuc.—But it appears to me that your hitting upon 


56 - THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


this answer has not been a mere accident. Indeed, 
the very law of nature itself implanted in our minds 
has proved your attention: for if I were to ask what 
man is, you would reply, perhaps, an animal. But 
if I were to ask what part of speech man is, you 
could answer correctly only a noun. Wherefore, 
while man is found to be both a noun and an ani- 
mal, this is expressed on the side where symbol is, 
that on the side of reality which is symbolized. To 
that one therefore who asks whether man- is a noun 
no other answer is to be given than the affirmative: 
for his question shows that he wants to know on 
the side of the symbol. But if he asks whether man 
is an animal I will respond in the affirmative even 
more readily. Because if, expressing neither noun 
nor animal, he were to ask simply what man is, the 
mind would turn, by that same fixed law of speech, 
to the object which is signified by the two syllables, 
homo, and the answer would be no other thing than 
animal: or even the full definition might be ex- 
pressed, that is, an animal rational and mortal. Is 
that not clear to you? 

Ap. — Quite clear: but, since we have granted 
that man is a noun, how shall we avoid that too 
flippant reply in which the conclusion is put to- 
gether that we are not men? 


SAINT AUGUSTINE ov 


Auc.—How think you, but by showing that the 
conclusion is not brought in from the side on which 
we agreed with the questioner. Or if he (the ques- 
tioner acknowledges that he refers to that (the reply 
on the side of the symbol), then nothing is to be 
feared (from its logical force), for what is there 
to be dreaded in acknowledging that I am not man, 
that is, these three syllables—hominem? * 

Ap.—Nothing more true. Why then is it offen- 
sive when the inference is expressed: “‘ You there- 
fore are not man’”’, when, according to these points 
granted, nothing is more true or more truly said? 

AvuG.—Because I cannot but think that the con- 
clusion has reference to that which is signified by 
these two syllables as soon as the words are ex- 
pressed, by reason of that law which is naturally 
very strong, so that the attention is turned to the 
objects signified immediately as soon as the symbols 
are perceived. 

Ap.—I take what you say. 


*Quid enim metuam hominem, id est, tres istas syllabas 
non esse me confiteri? 


58 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


CHAPTER IX 


Avuc.—I want you to understand, therefore, now 
that realities which are signified are to be rated at a 
higher value than their symbols. Whatsoever, in- 
deed, is on account of something else must be of 
less worth than that for which it is: unless you 
think otherwise. 

Ap. —It seems to me that assent is not to be 
granted here too hastily. For when we express the 
word filth,“ this noun I think is to be ranked far 
ahead of the reality which it signifies. What offends 
us when we hear is not the sound of this word; for 
by the change of one letter coenum (filth) becomes 
coelum (the sky); but we see what a difference 
there is between the objects signified by these nouns. 
Wherefore I would not attribute to this symbol 
what we shun in the object which it signifies. More 
readily, indeed, do we hear this than, by any one of 
the organs of sense, touch that. 

AuG. — Very keen, indeed. Therefore it is un- 
true that all realities are to be rated as of higher 
value than their signs. 

Ap.—So it seems. 


14 coenum., 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 59 


AucG. — Tell me, therefore, what plan you think 
they followed who gave a name to this object so 
foul and so much shunned (coenum): or whether 
you approve or disapprove their action. 

Ap. —JI dare not presume either to approve or 
disapprove: and I do not know what plan they fol- 
lowed. 

Avuc.—Can you find, at any rate, what your pur- 
pose.is when you pronounce this word? 

Ap.—I can, yes: My purpose is to signify so that 
I may teach him, with whom I speak, or remind 
him about that reality which I think ought to be 
taught or recalled. 

Auc.—How this? The very fact of teaching or 
of reminding, or of being taught or reminded, which 
either you express fittingly by this word, or which 
is expressed to you—is not that fact itself to be 
esteemed of higher value than the mere word? 

Ap. —TI grant that the knowledge which comes 
through this symbol, but I do not therefore think 
that the real object itself [filth] is so ranked. 

AvuG.—In this, our judgment, therefore, while it 
may not be true that all objective realities are to be 
ranked ahead of their symbols; it is not consequently 
untrue that every thing that is on account of an- 
other is less excellent than that other for which it is. 


GO THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


Indeed, the knowledge of filth, from which this 
noun has its fixed meaning, is to be esteemed of 
higher worth than the noun itself, which, we have 
found, is in turn to be esteemed more excellent than 
filth. But the one reason why knowledge 1s pre- 
ferred before its symbol, of which we are speaking, 
is that this latter is proved to be on account of the 
former, not the former on account of the latter. 
Thus, Af a certain glutton, and, as the Apostle has 
said, ‘a slave of sensuality’’,t° were to say that 
therefore he lives in order that he may eat; a tem- 
perate man, who has heard his words, has not the 
patience to endure, and says: How much better 
would it be to eat in order to live? He says this, 
indeed, in accordance with that same rule. For he 
disapproved for no other reason than this, that he 
(the glutton) should place a value so low upon his 
life as to esteem it cheaper than the pleasure of the 
palate, declaring that he lives for feasting. And 
this one ante be approved for no other reason 
rightly than because, understanding which one was 
for the other, that is, which subordinate to the 


15 The allusion is evidently to Romans, XVI, 18: “ Such 
men do not serve Christ, the Lord, but their own desires; 
and by soft words and pleasing speech they deceive the 
hearts of the innocent.” 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 61 


other, he uttered the admonition that food is to be 
taken in order that we may live: that we do not 
live in order to be fed. In like manner you also 
perhaps, or any man who values things rightly, 
might answer one who talks and a noisy lover of 
words, who says that he teaches in order to talk: 
Why, man, not rather: talk in order to teach? But 
if these things are true, as you know that they are, 
you see surely how much less words are to be 
esteemed than that on account of which we use 
words; because the very use itself of words is more 
excellent than words, for words are in order that we 
may use them, but we use them in order to teach. 
As teaching, therefore, is better than talking, so 1s 
language better than words. Far more excellent, 
therefore, is teaching than mere words. But I want 
to hear what you, perhaps, think can be said against 
this. 

Ap.—I am quite agreed, indeed, that teaching is 
better than words. But whether every thing, that is 
on account of something else, is so fixed as a rule, 
that nothing can contradict it, I do not know. 

AvuG.—Elsewhere we shall take up that problem 
more fittingly and more carefully. For the present, 
the point which you grant is enough for that which 
I wish to prove. For you grant that the knowledge 


62 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


of realities is more excellent than the symbols of 
realities. Therefore the knowledge of objective 
realities, which are signified, is to be preferred to 
the knowledge of their symbols (by which they are 
signified) : or does it not so seem to you? 

Ap.—Have I not granted that the knowledge of 
realities is to be preferred to the knowledge of sym- 
bols, and not to the symbols themselves? I fear, 
therefore, to be agreed with you here. For what, if, 
as the noun filth is to be ranked ahead of the objec- 
tive reality which it signifies, so also the knowledge 
of this noun should be given a place before the 
knowledge of its material object, though the noun 
itself may be less excellent than that knowledge? 
Indeed there are four points here —the noun, the 
real object, knowledge of the noun, knowledge of 
the real object. As the first, therefore, is more ex- 
cellent than the second, why may not the third also 
be better than the fourth? But granting that it 
may not be more worthy, does it follow that it must 
be counted as less? 

AuG.—TI see that you have retained quite well 
what you granted, and explained what you thought. 
But you understand, I think, that this noun of three 
syllables, which sounds when we say vitium (vice), 
is more excellent than that which it signifies; while 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 63 


the knowledge of the noun is much less perfect 
than acquaintance of vices. While, therefore, you 
may determine these four points, and study them— 
the noun, the objective reality, the knowledge of 
the noun and the knowledge of the object; we 
rightly rank the first ahead of the second. Thus 
this noun placed properly in its line, where Persius 
says: “ But this one is sotted with vice ’’,**® not only 
introduces no vice into the verse, but even adds 
something of ornament: while yet the objective 
reality, which is signified by this noun, makes 
vicious anything whatsoever in which it exists. 
But not so is the third ranked ahead of the fourth; 
for the fourth, we see, has a greater value than the 
third. Indeed the knowledge of this noun is of 
small importance compared with a knowledge of © 
vices.* 

Apv.—Think you that the knowledge of this last 
division is to be preferred even when it makes men 
more unhappy? For, of all the pains that the heart- 
lessness of tyrants has discovered, or their designs 


16 Sed stupet hic vitio—Aulus Persius Flaccus, a Roman 
Satyrist, born about A. D. 34. The words quoted are from 
Satyr. III, vers. 32. 


* The right ethical view of vice, of course, ‘is meant, the 
place of vice in the philosophy of human conduct. 


64 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


invented, this same Persius gives the first place to 
that one by which men are tortured, who are forced 
to acknowledge the vices which they can not avoid. 

Auc.—By that reasoning you can say the knowl- 
edge even of virtues is not to be preferred to the 
knowledge of this noun. For to see virtue, and not 
to have it is the punishment by which this same 
satyrist wished to have tyrants tortured. 

Ap.—God save us from such unreason. Now I 
see indeed that knowledge, by which learning nobly 
enriches the soul, is not to be blamed: but they, of 
all men, are to be esteemed the most unhappy, who, 
as Persius, I think, also judged, are afflicted by such 
disease that a remedy so powerful will not relieve it. 

Aue. — You understand well: but, whatever the 
judgment of Persius may be, is not to our point now. 
For in such problems we do not depend upon the 
authority of these men (satyrists as a class). Then 
again, whether knowledge on one subject is to be 
preferred to another, is not to be settled here off- 
hand. I hold what has been proved quite sufficiently : 
that is, that the knowledge of realities which are 
signified, while it may not be more excellent than 
the knowledge of its symbols, is yet more excellent 
than the symbols themselves. Wherefore let us study 
more and more thoroughly what is the quality of 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 65 


that class of realities, which we saw, can be shown 
by themselves, without symbols, as talking, walk- 
ing, sitting down, reclining, and other things of 
this kind. 

Av.—I recall now what you say. 


CHAPTER X 


AuG.—Does it appear to you that we can show 
without a sign all things that we can straightway 
do when we are questioned, or do you make some 
exception? 

Ap. —I, indeed, studying over and over again 
this class as a whole, find nothing yet that can be 
taught without some sign, except perhaps talking, 
and possibly if someone were to ask what teaching 
is. For I see that he, whatsoever I shall have done 
to make him learn, following his inquiry, does not 
learn really from the object which he wishes to have 
made clear to him. For, as has been said, if. he 
questions me about walking when I am not walk- 
ing, or when I am doing something else, and J, on 
the spot endeavor by walking to show what he has 
asked, how shall I prevent his thinking that to walk 
is just so much as I have walked? But if he thinks 
that he will be deceived; and, indeed, whosoever 


66 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


shall have walked more or less than I did, that one, 
he will think, has not walked. And what I have 
said of this one word will be true of all others, 
which I had thought could be shown without a sign, 
excepting the two named (talking and teaching). 

Avuc.—I accept that, indeed: But does it not ap- 
pear to you that talking is one thing, teaching an- 
other ? 

Ap.—It does seem so truly, for, if they were the 
same, no one would teach except in the fact of speak- 
ing; we however teach many things by means of 
other signs aside from words. Who, then, will 
doubt about the difference here? 

Avuc. — How, now, to teach and to signify, are 
they the same, or is there some difference? 

Ap.—I think they are the same. 

AvucG.—Does not he speak correctly who says that 
we signify in order that we may teach? 

Apv.—Correctly indeed. 

Auc.—What if another one says that we there- 
fore teach in order to signify, is he not easily refuted 
by the sentence above? 

Ap.—So, he is. 

AuG.—If, therefore, we signify in order to teach, 
we do not teach in order to signify: teaching is one 
thing, signifying another. 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 67 


Ap.—yYou speak truly; and I answered incorrectly 
that both are the same. 

Auc.—Now answer this, whether he who teaches 
what teaching is, does that by signifying, or other- 
wise. 

Ap.—I do not see how he could otherwise. 

Auc.— What you said, therefore, just a little 
ahead is untrue, that when the question is asked 
what teaching is, the reality can be taught without 
the means of signs; since we see that not even this 
can be done without signifying, where you have 
granted that to signify is one thing, to teach is an- 
other. For if they are distinct, as it appears they 
are, and this latter is shown only by the former, then 
it is not indeed shown by itself, as it appeared to 
you. Wherefore nothing has been found, as yet, 
that can be shown by means of itself, excepting 
language, which, among other things which it sig- 
nifies, signifies also itself: which yet, because itself 
is symbol, shows nothing that stands out clearly, 
that can be taught without means of symbols. 

Ap. —JI have nothing wherefor I may not be 
agreed. 

Aue.—It is established therefore that nothing is 
taught without symbols; also that the knowledge 
itself ought to be to us more precious than the 


68 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


symbols by which we know; though all things sig- 
nified may not have greater worth than their signs. 

Apb.—So it does appear. 

AuG. — By what a way around has a thing so 
small been completed, do you remember, I ask? For, 
from the time that we began this fencing of words, 
which we have been doing now for quite some time, 
it has been worked out that we find these three 
points: (1) whether nothing can be taught without 
the means of signs; (2) whether some signs are 
to be preferred to the objects which they signify; 
(3) whether the knowledge of things is more ex- 
cellent than their symbols. But there is a fourth 
point which [ would like to know from you briefly, 
1. e. whether you think that these points are so 
cleared up that now you can not doubt about them. 

Av. — I would wish indeed that we had reached 
security through such turnings and jolts; but this 
your question makes me somehow, I know not how, 
uneasy and timid about giving assent. For you, it 
appears to me, would not ask this question if you 
did not have something to say against it: and the 
tangle itself of subjects does not permit me to ex- 
amine the whole problem and to answer what is 
safe, fearing lest something may be hid in these 
windings that the keenness of my mind can not 
perceive. 


SAINT AUGUSTINE ; Doi 


AvucG.—I take your hesitancy not unwillingly, for | 
it indicates a mind not too hasty in its decisions, a 
most important safeguard of a tranquil mind. For 
it is very hard indeed not to be moved at all, when 
those things which we were wont to hold by ready 
and eager approval, are made to fall, and are 
wrenched, as it were, from our hands. Wherefore, 
as it is right to yield to reasons well studied and 
weighed, so it is perilous to hold things unknown as 
if we knew them. For, when those things which 
we presume are going to stand firmly and remain, 
are made to tumble down too frequently, it is to be 
feared that, falling into distaste and distrust of 
reason, we may lose confidence in clear truth itself. 

But come, now, let us review more thoroughly, 
and see whether you can think correctly that we 
may entertain doubt on these points. And now I 
ask (for example), if someone who knows nothing 
of the art of bird-catching, which is wont to be done 
by means of reeds and birdlime, if such a one were 
to meet a birdcatcher, fitted out in his hunting dress, 
not hunting, but walking on the way; seeing him, 
the stranger would stop astonished, and, as is usual, 
think, wondering and inquiring what this make-up 
of a man could mean. But the birdcatcher seeing 
the astonished observer, with the purpose of mak- 


70 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


ing himself known, throws off the reeds, and, by 
means of the sling and the snare, takes aim, 
strikes and captures a bird which he sees near by; 
would not this birdcatcher teach his spectator what 
he wanted to know by means of no sign made but 
the very objective reality itself? 

Apv.—I fear that there may be something here like 
that which I said of him who asks what walking is, 
And, indeed I see that the whole art of birdcatching 
is not here set forth. 

AuG. — It is easy to free yourself of that care; 
for I will add this: if the observer is so keenly in- 
telligent that he grasps this complete branch of the 
art from what he sees. For it is to our point well 
enough if some things, though not all, can be shown, 
and some men can be taught without a symbol. 

Av.—That I also can add to this other one: for, 
if he is quick to understand, he will know what 
walking is fully, when walking is shown to him by 
a few paces. : 

AvuG.—You may do that. I will grant it. And 
I not only do not oppose, but I favor the solution. 
You see, moreover, that this conclusion is reached 
by both of us, that, namely, some things can be 
taught without the means of symbols: and that what 
appeared right to us a little ago is not true, that, 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 71 


namely, there is nothing absolutely that can be 
shown without symbols. For of these, not one only 
or another, but thousands of things come to mind 
which can be shown, without a sign expressed, but 
by themselves. For passing over numberless shows 
of men making exhibition in every theatre, without 
a sign, by means of the very realities themselves, 
does not God and does not nature exhibit and show 
to those who see them, the sun surely and this light 
diffused and clothing all these things visible, the 
moon also and other planets, the earth and the sea, 
and whatever lives in them without number. 

But if we study more closely perhaps you will 
find that there is nothing actually learned by means 
of symbols: for when a sign is given to me, if it 
finds me not knowing the reality of which it is the 
sign, that sign can teach me nothing; but if it finds 
me knowing the reality, what then do I learn by the 
sign? For when I read: “And their saraballae were 
not changed’’,*” the word (saraballae) does not 
show me the reality which it signifies. Indeed if a 


17 Daniel, chap. III, vers. 94—pre-Hieronomyan text. 

The word saraballae, a term of Chaldaic origin, is given 
here as an example of a symbol the meaning of which 
can not be known until it is translated into a known lan- 
guage. 


72 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


certain head dress is called by this name, have I 
therefore, by the hearing of this word, learned what 
head is or what dress ** is? I had known these be- 
fore; and the knowledge of them came to me, not 
when they were named by others, but when they 
were seen by me. Indeed when these two syllables, 
which we utter when we say caput, first struck my 
ears I knew as little what they meant as when first 
I heard or read saraballae. But when caput (the 
word) was spoken repeatedly, I, remarking and 
taking note when it was spoken, found that it is the 
vocal term (the sign) of a reality which was al- 
ready quite familiarly known to me by sight. But 
before I made this discovery this word was to me 
merely sound: I learned, however, that it is a sign, 
then, when I discovered of what reality it is the 
sign, which, as I have said, I learned, not by its 
signification, but by the sight of it. Therefore that 
the sign is learned by means of a known reality is 
more truly correct than that a reality is learned by 
means of its given sign. 

In order that you may understand this more 
thoroughly, let us suppose that we hear now for the 
first time the word spoken caput, and not knowing 


18 tegmina—head coverings. 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 73 


whether it is a sounding voice only, or signifying 
something also, we ask what caput is (remember 
that we want to have the knowledge, not of the real 
object which is signified, but of the sign of it, 
which knowledge we have not so long as we do not 
know of what reality it is the sign). If therefore 
to us thus inquiring, the object is pointed out with 
the finger, it is by that seeing that we learn the 
meaning of the sign, which before we had heard 
only, and not known. In this symbol, however, 
there are two elements, sound and meaning. We 
surely do not perceive the sound from the fact that 
it is a sign, but by the very fact that it strikes the 
ear; but the meaning we get by noting the reality 
which is signified. For, if that pointing of the 
finger can signify no other thing than that to which 
the pointing is; but the pointing is, not to the sign, 
but to the member which is called head; the con- 
clusion must be that I have not learned the reality 
by that pointing, because I knew it beforehand, nor 
did I learn the sign, to which the pointing is not 
made. But I do not insist too much on the point- 
ing of the finger; for to me it seems to be rather a 
sign of demonstration than a pointing out of the 
realities, whatever they may be, which are pointed 
out: as the adverb which we express, saying: “lo” 


74 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


or “behold”: for with this adverb also we are 
wont to extend the finger, lest one sign of demon- 
strating may not be enough. And, if I can, I shall 
try to prove this to you first of all, that by signs, 
which are called words, we learn nothing. For it 
is more true, as I have said, that we learn the force 
of the word, that is the meaning which is concealed 
in its sound by knowledge of the reality, which is 
signified, than that we perceive the reality by such 
signification. 

Then, what I have said of head, that same I 
might have said also of coverings, and of number- 
less other things, which yet I now know, though 
these sarabellae, to the present time, I have not 
known; which yet, if someone were to signify their 
meaning by gesture or were to make a drawing of 
them, or were to point out something to which they 
are like, I will not say that he would not be teaching 
me, which I could do easily, if I wished to talk a 
little more: but I do say, what is very much to the 
point, he would not teach me by means of words. 
But if someone, having seen by chance this head 
dress (saraballae) where I am present with him, 
shall have brought the fact to my notice, saying: 
behold the saraballae, I may learn a thing which I 
did not know. I learn not by the words which are 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 75 


uttered, but by the sight of that object, whence 
the result follows that I know and retain what is 
the force of that name. For when I learned the 
very reality of the object, I was not giving credit to 
the words of others, but to my own eyes. These, 
the words yet perhaps I did believe in order to take 
note, that is, in order to find what I could see by 
looking. 


Cob Linh 5 


So far words have value (to give them their very 
most): they remind us only to look for realities, 
they do not so exhibit the realities that we know 
them. But that one teaches me something, who 
holds out to my eyes, or to any one of the senses of 
the body, or even to the mind the things which I 
desire to know. By means of words, therefore, we 
learn only words: more still, only the sound and 
noise of words. For if those things which are not 
signs can not be words; though a word may be 
heard, I yet do not know that it is a word until I 
know its signification. By means, therefore, of 
realities known the knowledge of words also is 
made perfect: but by means of words heard, words 
are not learned; for we do not learn words that we 
know; nor can we say that we have learned words, 


76 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


which we did not know, except by getting their 
meaning, which is, not by the hearing of sounds 
sent forth, but by the knowledge of realities signi- 
_ fied. For it is the truest reason, and most truly 
said, that when words are uttered, we either know 
their meaning, or we do not: if we know, then we 
are said to be recalling rather than learning; but if 
we know not the meaning, then we are said not 
even to be recalling, but possibly we are moved to 
inquire. 

But if you say that we can not know those head 
coverings, the name of which we know only so far 
as the sound goes, except by seeing them: On the 
other hand, we can not know the name itself quite 
fully, but by knowing the realities [of which the 
name or the noun is the symbol]. 

What we have received, finally, of the Senet 
themselves, how they triumphed over the king and 
over the fires by faith and religion, what praises they 
sang to God, what honors they won even from their 
very enemy—all this have we learned otherwise than 
by words? I will answer that everything signified 
by these words had been beforehand the subject of 
our knowledge. For what three youths are, what a 
furnace is, what fire is, what a king, what, finally, 
being unhurt by fire and all the rest which these 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 77 


words signify, I knew and held before I had the 
experience of hearing these words. But Anantas 
and Azarius and Misael are to me strangers, just as 
much as this strange word, saraballae; and these 
names have not helped me, and cannot now help me 
to know these men. But the facts all together, which 
are described in the account of history, I acknowl- 
edge that I believe to have been so done as they are 
described rather than that I know them: and they 
whom we believe too were not in ignorance as to 
this point of difference (between believing and 
knowing). For the Prophet says: “Unless you 
believe you shall not understand’”’;*® which he 
would not have said if he had thought that there 
is no difference between the two. 

What I understand, that also I believe: but not 
everything that I believe do I also understand. 
Everything that I understand, however, I also 
know: I do not know all that I believe. And I do 
not, therefore, not know how useful it is to take on 
trust also many things that I do not know. With 


19 Tsaias, VII, 9: But the quotation is according to a 
pre-Hieronymian reading of the Latin text—one of the 
thousands of minor text variations, which have not changed 
the substantial meaning or the sense of the Bible—See 
APPENDIX, note 2,—page 96. 


hs THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


this advantage of believing I count also this narra- 
tive of the three youths.*° Wherefore, while there 
is a vast reach of things that I can not know, I do 
know what is the advantage of believing. 

But, referring now to all things that we under- 
stand, we consult, not the one speaking, whose 
words sound without, but truth within, presiding 
over the mind, reminded perhaps by words to take 
note (to mark evidence). But he teaches who is 
consulted, me who is said to “dwell in the 
interior man’’:** that is, the changeless power of 
God,* and the everlasting wisdom, which truly 
every rational soul consults: but so far is it opened 
out to each one, as each one is capable to grasp by 
reason of a good or a bad habit of life. And, if 
sometimes errors are made, that is not by reason 
of fault in the objective evidence consulted; just as 
it is also not the fault of this light, which is bright 
without, that the eyes of the body are frequently 
deceived: This light (external) we acknowledge is 
sought in reference to things visible in order that 
it may show us visible niece so far as we have 
tl.e power to discern. 


20 The account taken from Daniel, as above. 
21 Ephesians, III, 16-17. 
* See APPENDIX, note 3,—page 97. 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 79 


OPE Bay CLL 


But, if we consult the light in reference to colors 
aid the other properties which we perceive through 
the body; if we consult the elements of this world, 
the same also corporeal, the objects of our senses; 
if we consult the organic senses themselves, which 
the mind uses as interpreters to know such things; 
and, if in reference to those things that we under- 
stand, we consult interior evidence, what can be 
said to have it made clear that by means of words. 
we learn nothing but the sound that strikes the ear? 
And indeed everything that we perceive, we per- 
ceive either by a corporeal organ of sense, or by 
the power of the mind. These former are the object 
of the senses, the latter of understanding: or, to 
speak after the manner of our own (Christian) 
authors, we give the name carnal to the former, 
spiritual to the latter. When we are questioned 
concerning these former, we answer what we per- 
ceive if they are present: as when we are questioned 
looking at the new moon as to its size and position. 
Here he who asks, if he does not see the moon, be- 
lieves our words, and often he believes not: but he 
does not learn at all, unless he himself sees what is 
described. Here now he learns, not by means of the 


80 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


words which are sounded, but by means of objective 
reality and his own senses. For the same words 
sound to one seeing, as they also sounded to him 
not seeing. But when there is question, not about 
things which we perceive present, but about what 
we have formerly perceived, we speak then, not of 
things themselves, but of images impressed by them 
and stored in the memory. As to these, how we 
can utter them truly, if we do not behold them as 
true, I do not know, except that we tell or recount, 
not what we see or perceive, but what we have seen 
or have perceived. Thus do we carry in the inner 
courts of memory those images, documents of 
things perceived before. Contemplating these in 
mind we utter no falsehood when we speak in good 
conscience. But these documents * are for us; for 
he who hears us (telling of past experience), if he 
has perceived the facts that I tell, and if he was 
present, does not learn by my words; but he recalls 
by means of the impressions which he has taken 
away of the same facts; but, if he did not himself 
experience what I tell, who does not see that such a 
one learns not, but rather believes * my words? 


22 documenta—means or the instruments of teaching us. 
* The distinction which Augustine makes here between 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 81 


But when there is question of those things which 
we view in the mind, that is, by means of understand- 
ing and reason, we speak truly the things which we 
behold as present in that interior light of truth, by 
which he who is called the interior man is enlight- 
ened, whence also comes his joy. But then also our 
hearer, if he himself sees those things with the 
simple and unseen eye, knows what I say, not by 
means of my words, but by his own judgment— 
the vision of his own mind. Therefore I, speak- 
ing what is true, do not teach even this one viewing 
the same true things in his own mind; for he is 
taught, not by means of my words, but by means of 
the same mental realities which God, by the natural 
light of intelligence opens out within the soul: 
whence, if questioned, he might have answered the 
very same. But what is more unreasonable than to 
think that he is taught by my speech, who, if he 
were questioned before I spoke, could have explained 
the very same? or, it frequently happens, that 


learning and believing is obvious. It is the difference be- 
tween renewing our own former sense impressions, con- 
scious of their objective reality, and holding what we hear 
on the word of a witness until it is verified by our own 
experience, proved or confirmed by the common agree- 
ment of men. 


§2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


being questioned, someone answers in the negative,. 
and then when he is urged by other questions, replies 
affirmatively. That is done by reason of the weakness. 
of the one who seeing can not consult this light 
on the entire problem. He is reminded to do this in 
particular points, when he is questioned upon them 
one by one. The very same which he can not do 
in the entire problem, he can discern in the parts 
of which the whole is made up, whereto, he 1s 
directed by the words of the one who questions, not 
yet by teaching words, but by words inquiring in 
that measure in which he who is questioned is within, 
in the inner powers of the soul, fit to learn. Just as, 
when I was asking this very question on which we 
are now engaged: whether or not nothing can be 
taught by means of words, and first it seemed to 
you unreasonable, because you were unable to see 
clearly the whole problem. So, therefore, should I 
have placed my questions as to make them corres- 
pond to the powers of your mind to hear that master 
teaching within. Thus I would express what you 
acknowledge to be true while I am talking: and you 
are sure, and you affirm that you know these things. 
Whence did you learn them? You might say, per- 
haps, that I taught them. Then I would reply: 
What if I were to say that I had seen a man flying? 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 83 


Would my words so then make you secure as if you 
were to hear it said that men of understanding are 
better than fools? You would answer in the nega- 
tive surely; and you might reply that you do not 
believe the former; or, even though you were to be- 
lieve, that you know nothing about it; but this 
latter, you would say you know most surely. From 
this now, by way of example, you would understand 
that you have not learned anything by means of my 
words: not in that, about which, after my stating it, 
you remained in ignorance (the flying exploit), and 
not in that which you knew very well (the relative 
worth of reasoning men and fools). And indeed, 
even though you were to be questioned about each 
one of these points, you could take an oath that that 
is unknown, that this is well known to you. 

Then, in truth, would you acknowledge all that 
you had formerly denied, when you knew, as points 
clear and certain, the elements of which all that is 
made up: namely that all things that we speak (stand 
in one of three relations to our hearers) :—Either the 
hearer knows not whether or not they are true, or 
he knows that they are untrue, or he knows that 
they are true. In the first case of these three he will 
either believe (take on trust) or he will form an 
opinion, or he will hesitate. In the second case he 


84 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


will either take a stand against what is said, or he 
will reject it. In the third he simply witnesses to 
what has been said (confirming its truth). In no 
case of these three, therefore, does he learn. For he 
who, after hearing our words, still remains ignorant 
as to their objective meaning; as he also, who knows 
that what he has heard is untrue; and he again who 
could have expressed the very same thought, if he 
had been asked, is proved surely to have learned 
nothing by means of my words. 


CHAR UR R CTE 


From the foregoing it follows, therefore, that in 
the things which are discerned by the mind,** one 
who can not grasp that which the mind of the speaker 
discerns, hears his words to no purpose, excepting 
the case where it is practicable to take a thing on 
trust so long as it can not be known. But he (in 
this division of realities of the mind) who sees 
clearly what words mean, is, in the court of the 


28 Things which the mind discerns—realities of thought 
which transcend the powers of the material organism—as 
goodness, right, wrong, being and the qualities which we 
find in the actual world of things and attribute to other 
things. 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 85 


mind, a disciple of the truth; in the world of ex- 
ternal things, he is the judge of the one who speaks, 
or more properly of his speech. Not unfrequently 
indeed the hearer knows what has been said, while 
the speaker may perhaps not know the force of his 
own words. As where someone who follows the 
Epicurean school of philosophy, and who believes 
that the human soul is mortal, may express those 
very reasons by which more far-seeing thinkers have 
proved its immortality: He hearing, who can judge 
things spiritual, thinks that such a one has uttered 
valid arguments: but he who speaks them knows not 
that they are true; even more, he thinks that they 
are quite untrue. Is he, therefore, to be thought of 
as teaching what he does not know? But he uses 
the very same words, which one who knows could 
also use. | 

Wherefore now not even this is left to words, 
that by them the mind of the speaker at least is made 
manifest, since it is not certain whether he knows 
what he is talking about. Take in addition those 
who lie and those who deceive, by whom you will 
understand easily that not only is the mind opened 
by means of words, but by means of words also the 
mind is concealed. For I do not by ary means call 
into question the fact that the words of truthful men 


86 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


aim at this and profess to make clear the meaning, 
the mind of the speaker. They indeed would realize 
this, as every-one grants, if liars were not allowed 
to speak. 

However, we may have experienced, both in our- 
selves and in others, that frequently words are ex- 
pressed which are not the proper terms of the 
thought actually in mind; which I see can be verified 
in two ways: when (first) either a form of speech 
memorized and frequently repeated is expressed by 
one who is thinking of other things, which is veri- 
fied in us often when we chant a hymn: (second) 
when, aside from our intention, and by a slip of the 
tongue, some words escape us in place of others, 
which we meant to say: for here also signs are 
heard not of those realities which we had in mind 
(but other things not then actually the object of our 
thought or intention). And indeed they who lie 
think also of the thing that they are saying. Though 
we may not know whether or not they speak the 
truth, we do know that they have in mind what they 
are saying, if one of the two points, which I have 
just made as exceptions, is not verified in them: 
which, if someone insists that it does sometimes 
happen, as appears when it does happen (though 
frequently it is unknown, and has deceived me 
often), I do not oppose such a statement. 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 87 


But in addition to these there is another class (of 
words that do not convey their meaning), a class 
far-reaching indeed, and the source of numberless 
misunderstandings and disputes. That is, when he 
who speaks is thinking of the same things which he 
utters, indeed; but frequently the same only to him- 
self and to some others: but to the one to whom he 
is speaking, and to others also the word has not the 
same meaning. Let someone say, for example, in 
our hearing, that by some brute animals man is 
surpassed in manly force (virtute) : we, on the spur 
of the moment, can not endure it, and with much 
animation we reject the sentence so untrue and so 
harmful; while he, perhaps, the speaker, is using 
the term manly force (virtutem) to mean the phys- 
ical strength of the body; and by that noun he may 
be pronouncing that which he has in mind, and he 
does not lie, and he is not wrong in reality, and he 
has not put together words that lingered in his 
memory, while he was revolving something else in 
mind, and he is not, by a slip of the tongue, giving 
utterance to something other than that which he 
turns over in mind: but he is only calling that reality 
_ of which he is thinking by a name other than that 
which we call it. On this point we would be imme- 
diately agreed with him if we could see his thought, 


88 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


which thought, by the words uttered and by the 
sentence completed, he has not yet been able to lay 
open to us. A definition, they say, will remedy this 
source of error; so that if, in this dispute, the 
speaker were to define what manly force (virtus) is, 
it would be clear, they say, that the disagreement 
is not about the objective reality, but about the 
meaning of a word. If I am to grant that this 
is so, how often is one found who makes a good 
definition? And yet there are many arguments 
against the systematic teaching of the art of argu- 
mentation; which it is not in line with our purpose 
to study now, and they are not on all sides approved 
by me. 

I pass over the fact that there are many things 
that we do not hear distinctly, and yet we are insis- 
tent long and strongly as if we had heard accurately. 
As you, just a little while ago, were saying that you 
had heard that by a certain Punic word piety is 
signified, that, too, from those to whom this lan- 
guage is quite familiar, while I said that the word 
means mercy. Then insisting, I said that you had 
forgotten what you had heard: for it seemed to me 
that you had said, not piety, but faith, while yet you 
were seated quite close to me, and these two nouns 
do not by any means deceive the ears by reason of 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 89 


likeness of sound. Yet for some time I thought 
that you knew not what had been said to you: (in- 
stead the truth was) I did not know what you had 
said: for if I had heard you correctly, it would not 
have appeared to me at all unreasonable that piety 
and mercy are signified by the same word in the 
Punic tongue.* These things happen not unfre- 
‘quently: but we shall pass them over, as I said, in 
order that I may not appear to be doing an injury 
to words, where the carelessness of the hearer is to 
be blamed, or again the deafness of men. .Those 
points, which I referred to above, are more difficult, 
where by means of the words very clearly perceived 
by the ear, and truly Latin, we can not yet, though 
we are of the same tongue, know the thought of the 
speaker. 

But now I go back and I grant that when words 
are perceived by the hearing of one who knows their 
meaning, he may be assured that the speaker has 


*It appears from this reference to the Punic tongue, 
and other allusions in Augustine’s works, that the Roman 
Africans of the time were generally familiar with the 
language of the old culture of Carthage. An example is 
found in Sermo CLXVII:—Proverbum notum est Puni- 
cum, quod quidem Latine vobis dicam, quia Punice non 
omnes nostis—Confer Epist. XVII ad Maximum Madau- 
rensem, num. 2, 


90 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


been thinking of those realities which the words 
signify: does it follow from this—the point which 
we are studying here—that he learns also whether or 
not the speaker has uttered the truth? 


CHAPTER XIV 


Do teachers make the claim that their own 
thoughts, and not rather the branches of learning 
which they think they deliver by talking, are per- 
ceived and retained by pupils? Who, indeed, is so 
unreasonably careful as to send his child to school 
to learn what the teacher thinks? But all these 
branches of learning, which teachers profess to teach, 
the doctrine of virtue even and of wisdom itself, 
when they have explained them by means of words; 
then they who are called pupils, consider in the 
inner court of the mind whether what has been said 
is true, that is, in the measure of their own mental 
power they see the agreement that is within. Then, 
therefore, they learn; and when they find within 
that true things have been spoken, they applaud, not 
knowing that their applause belongs rather to those 
who are taught than to their teachers: if, indeed, 
the teachers know what they are talking about. But 
men are deceived, so that they call those teachers, 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 91 


who are not teachers at all, just because generally no 
pause intervenes between the time of speaking and 
the time of thinking: and because after the sugges- 
tion of the one who speaks they learn instantaneously 
within, they think that they have learned from him 
who spoke from without. 

But what the full advantage is of words, not a 
small advantage indeed, if it is rightly viewed, we 
shall study, if God so grants, elsewhere. For the 
present I have brought to your notice that we must 
not give to words more than belongs to them. So 
that now we may not only believe, but we may begin 
to understand also how truly the word is written on 
divine authority that we claim no one as our master 
on earth, because one is the Master of all in heaven. 
But what the meaning is of this “in heaven’, He 
will teach us, by whom we are reminded through 
the instrumentality of men, by means of word sym- 
bols, and from without, so that turned to Him 
within, we may become learned in the inner life of 
the soul. He will teach us, to love whom and to 
know whom is itself the happiness of life; that 
happiness which all men declare that they seek; but 
few have rejoiced in finding it. But now I want 


24 Matthew, cap. XXIII, vv. 8-10. 


92 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


you to tell me what you think of this whole explana- 
tion of mine. For if you have approved all that 
has been said as true, then you might have answered 
on every sentence, one by one, that you know it, if 
you had been questioned. You see, therefore, from 
whom you have learned these points. Surely not 
from me, to whom you could have given the correct 
answer in every point, if I had asked. But if you 
have not known these things to be true, then neither 
do I teach you, nor he (the inner man, the judgment 
of reason from within) : but I do not teach, because 
I never can teach; he does not teach, because you as 
yet are incapable of learning.* 

Ap. — But I have learned by the admonition of 
your words that by the means of words a man can 
do no more than be admonished to learn; and that 
it is very little, indeed, some little fraction only of 
the thought of the one who speaks that is made ap- 
parent by the means of his language. But whether 
the things that are spoken are true or not, I have 
learned that he alone can teach who dwells within, 
who reminds us that he is dwelling within, when 
words are spoken without. This same dweller within 
I shall now, by his own favor, love the more ardently 
as I advance in knowing him better. However for 


* See APPENDIX, note 4,—page 97. 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 93 


this reasoned explanation of yours, which you have 
used continually, I am grateful chiefly on this ac- 
count, that every point which I was ready to con- 
tradict, your explanation took up and solved the 
difficulty: and nothing absolutely, that was making 
me doubt, has been left by you, on which that un- 
seen judgment within would not give the same 
answer to me as was stated by your words from 
without. © 





APPENDIX 


Notre I, page 12—The prayer of priests—Sicut sacerdotes 
faciunt—This refers evidently to some of the beautiful expres- 
sions of Catholic faith and piety which come to us from the 
early centuries, chiefly in the Liturgy of the Eucharist and the 
public service of the Church. Augustine and the boy, Adeo- 
datus, had come to know these prayers and to follow their 
meaning first in the Cathedral church of Saint Ambrose in 
Milan, later in Rome, on their homeward journal, 387, and 
now in the churches of provincial Africa. In later years, 
when Augustine was bishop, he points frequently to these 
prayers of the ‘Liturgy as to an index and a proof of the 
Catholic thought, the mind and the meaning of the Apostolic 
Church. The same thought is expressed by Pope Coelestine 
I after Augustine’s death, about 431, in a letter addressed to 
the ‘Bishops of Gaul:—“Obsecrationum quoque sacerdotalium 
sacramenta respiciamus, quae ab Apostolis tradita in toto 
mundo atque in omni Catholica Ecclesia uniformiter cele- 
brantur: ut legem credendi lex statuat supplicandi—Vide 
Denzinger—Enchiridion Symbolorum—Edit. decima, num. 
139. I shall try to turn the thought of Augusine into Eng- 
lish on this same point, De Civitate Dei, lib. VIII, cap. 27— 

“But who of the faithful has ever heard a priest standing 
at the altar of God, at an altar built unto the honor and 
worship of ‘God, and built over the body of a Martyr—who 
has ever heard a priest, in the prayers there, say: “I offer 
to thee, Peter, or I offer to thee, Paul, or I offer to thee, 


96 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


Cyprian? Yet the offering is to God in the memorial churches 
of these [Martyrs]—The offering is to God, who made them 
men and made them Martyrs, and raised them to heavenly 
honor with his holy angels. Thus we [by that external wor- 
ship] express gratitude to-the true God for their triumph; 
and, by renewing remembrances of such crowns and rewards. 
of victory, we are encouraged, invoking his name, by his aid, 
to follow on, to persevere. Whatever services, therefore, are 
offered in the holy places of Martyrs are ornaments to their 
memory, they are not divine rites or sacrifice offered to dead 
men. ... They are sacred to the merits of the Martyrs in 
the name of the Lord of- Martyrs. But he who knows the 
one Sacrifice of (Christians, which is offered there, knows also 
that these are not sacrifices offered to the Martyrs”. 


NOTE 2, page 77-The text :—‘\Nisi credideritis non intelli- 
getis ”—Isaias, VII-9, according to an ancient Latin version, is 
quoted frequently by Augustine-to explain the psychology of 
Faith and the act of believing. Some of the explanations are 
types of accurate and clear thought. They are worthy of 
study— 

Thus in a letter written about A.D. 413 on the subject of 
“Seeing God” Augustine says:—‘ Our knowledge is made up 
of things seen and things believed; but in things which we 
see, we also ourselves are witnesses; in things which we be- 
lieve we are moved to have faith by the witnessing of others: 
while in those things which we do not recall as having seen, 
and which we do not now see, there are symbols either in 
spoken words or in written forms, or in documents of some 
kind, which being seen, other things that are not seen are 
believed. But we say quite correctly that we know, not only 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 97 


things that we have seen or that we see now, but we know 
also, whatsoever we have believed moved by [the authority 
of] fitting testimony or witnesses. Further, if we are said 
not ineptly to know that which we most firmly believe, it 
follows that we may be said to behold in mind things which 
we rightly hold on credit, though they be not present to our 
senses. For knowledge is attributed to the mind, whether 
the mind retains something known through [the instrumen- 
tality of] the organs of sense, or through a power of the soul 
itself: And Faith [the idea] itself indeed is seen by the mind, 
though in virtue of that very same faith we believe what is 
not seen”—(Epist. ad Paulinam, cxtvu, n. 8. See also 
Enarrat. in Psalm, cxviti—Serm. 18, n. 3; Tract in Joann, 
XVII, 0: 7: 


Norte 3, page 78—The changeless power of God and his ever- 
lasting wisdom—These words refer evidently to the text in the 
First Epistle to the ‘Corinthians: “ Christum Dei virtutem et 
Dei sapientiam....praedicamus ”—cap. I, v. 24—The thought 
centers upon the eternal ‘Worp and the Wisdom of God in 
person—the éAédyos, “Lux vera quae illuminat omnem homi- 
nem venienten in hunc mundum”. (John, 1-9)—It is the 
simple strong logic of facts as they follow from the fact of 
the Incarnation—the same logic which translates itself into 
faith and ‘Christian Life, which is revealed in the results of 
Christian civilization and art. The same thought will be 
found expressed by Augustine in the Tracts upon the Gospel 
according to St. John—See Tract. in Joan. II; see also Epist. 
ad Volusianum, CXXXVII. 


Note 4, page 92—The thought of Augustine here is funda- 
mental to any workabie theory or practice of teaching. It does 


98 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING 


not detract from the efficiency of the work of a teacher, evid- 
enced in the complete argument of this little treatise. It does 
not lessen the need of method in teaching, and the help to be 
found in methods for both teacher and pupil. Augustine 
simply insists upon what he has shown to be a prerequisite 
for teaching and learning. He drives home the point which 
he has tried to make clear, that is, the power of the pupil to 
grasp a thought, to assimilate, to make it his own will be the 
measure of what he learns. 

Augustine’s allusion here to the divine Teacher, to Christ, 
the supreme Master of human intelligence is to be understood, 
as he explains elsewhere, not of a supernatural light of grace, 
or of a divine energy above the established order of nature. 
The reference to ‘Christ is to ‘Christ in this divine Person- 
ality, to Christ as God, the Author of created things, the 
Author therefore of that power in the human mind which 
grasps objective truth, which knows truth normally by pro- 
cess of reasoning and intuition, which can not reject the evid- 
ence of objective reality. Christ, the Teacher is understood 
as the supreme Power and Intelligence. His design is re- 
vealed in the order of nature established in the universe. 
His law, the laws of nature are seen at work in the phenomena 
of this visible frame of living and non-living things. 

‘Speaking on this same point in De Trinitate Augustine says: 
But it is rather to be held that the nature of the intelligent 
mind is so made that connected with its own intelligible 
realities in the natural order, God so ordering, it beholds 
these in a certain light of its own kind, incorporeal: just as 
the eye, this organ of sense, in this corporeal light, beholds 
the objects within its range for which it has its own capacity 
and fitness.’"—(De Trinitate, lib. xt, cap. 15).* 


SAINT AUGUSTINE 99 


* Sed potius credendum est mentis intellectualis ita conditam 
esse naturam, ut rebus intelligibilibus, naturali ordine, dis- 
ponente 'Conditore, subiuncta sic ista videat in quadam luce 
sui generis incorporea, quedmadmodum oculus carnis videt 
quae in hac corporea luce circumadiacent, cuius lucis capax 
eique congruens est creatus. De Trinitate—lib. x11, cap. 15. 


FINIS 


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Pe KMRL ts 


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LB125 .A92 
The philosophy of teaching : a study in 


eton Theological Seminary—Speer Library 


Vil NUNN 


1 1012 00068 3260 





